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MILITARY LAW-Military Jurisdiction over Crimes 
Committed hy Military Personnel Outside the 
United States: The Effect of O'Callahan 
v. Parker 
[Vol. 68 
The authority of Congress to bestow upon the armed forces 
exclusive jurisdiction over military offenses is derived from article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to 
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces."1 In addition, because disciplinary requirements make 
1. This power has been exercised by Congress by conferring jurisdiction on the 
military in the Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ] art, 2, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 802 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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impracticable the application in military trials of all of the procedural 
safeguards afforded defendants in civilian trials, the Constitution 
specifically provides that certain of these safeguards need not be 
recognized by military courts.2 For example, the fifth amendment's 
requirement for grand jury indictment is specifically exempted in 
"cases arising in the land and naval forces."3 This exemption has also 
been interpreted to remove from the military court system the jury 
trial requirement of the sixth amendment.4 In addition to these 
express constitutional mandates concerning procedural exemptions, 
there also exists a traditional skepticism as to the ability of the 
military establishment to provide tribunals with other procedural 
qualifications "deemed essential to fair trials of civilians."5 At least 
on the surface, then, it seems clear that a criminal defendant is the 
beneficiary of significantly fewer procedural safeguards when he is 
tried in a military court than he is when he is tried in a civilian 
court. Consequently, it is essential that there be well-defined criteria 
for determining when military jurisdiction should attach. 
Until recently, it had generally been considered that the mini-
mum condition necessary to justify the invocation of military juris-
diction was the offender's "status" as "a person who can be regarded 
as falling within the term 'land and naval forces.' " 6 In O' Callahan 
2. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
2, 123 (1866). 
5. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955): 
And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of 
justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that 
military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such 
way that they can have the same kind of qualification that the Constitution has 
deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Con-
stitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in 
military trials. They are appointed by military commanders and may be removed 
at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries. 
Strides have been made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the 
e.xecutive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. 
But from the very nature of things, courts have more independence in passing on 
the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals. 
Action has been undertaken, however, to alleviate some of the more serious objec-
tions to trial by a military tribunal. See generally Mounts &: Sugarman, The Military 
Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (1969); Nelson &: Westbrook, Court-Martial Juris-
diction over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 
54 MINN. L. REv. l, 56-64 (1969); Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial 
and Civilian Practice, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1240 (1968). See also Bishop, The Quality of 
Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. 
6. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 241 (1960); Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. l (1957); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Johnson v. 
Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); Coleman v. Tennes-
see, 97 U.S. 509 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See also the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Harlan in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 275 (1969), 
noting that prior to that decision, military status had consistently been considered by 
the Court as a "necessary and sufficient condition for the exercise of court martial 
jurisdiction." 
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v. Parker,7 however, the United States Supreme Court determined 
that while military status is still requisite to the attachment of 
military jurisdiction, it is not a sufficient basis in and of itself to 
warrant trial by a military tribunal. In a five to three decision au-
thored by Justice Douglas, the Court held that in order for military 
jurisdiction to attach, the crimes for which prosecution is sought 
must have been "service-connected."8 Thus, there has emerged a two-
pronged test for ascertaining the proper attachment of court-martial 
jurisdiction: (1) the offender must have the status of being a member 
of the armed forces, and (2) the offense must be service-connected. 
The ramifications of this dramatic development in military law 
are extensive. Because the Court in O'Callahan established new 
standards to be met at the initial jurisdictional stages of the judicial 
process, the effect of the decision may be expected to pervade almost 
all aspects of military justice.0 A particularly significant issue is 
raised by the application of the decision in foreign locations, ·where 
the denial of military jurisdiction presents intricate practical prob-
lems which do not result from a similar denial in domestic situations. 
The purpose of this Note, then, is to examine the O'Callahan holding 
with regard to its applicability to situations involving crimes of a 
nonmilitary nature committed by servicemen while serving under 
peacetime conditions in foreign countries. 
I. THE HOLDING AND IMPACT OF Q'CALLAHAN 
The defendant involved in the O'Callahan decision was an Army 
sergeant stationed in Hawaii; while on leave and in civilian clothes, 
he broke into a girl's hotel room and assaulted and attempted to 
rape her. He was convicted at a court-martial on charges of attempted 
rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape.10 His conviction 
was affirmed by the Army Board of Review and by the United States 
Court of Military Appeals.11 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
was denied by a United States district court without discussion of 
the merits,12 and the denial was subsequently affirmed by the United 
7. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
8. 395 U.S. at 272. 
9. For an extensive analysis of the practical effects and implications of O'Callahan 
v. Parker, as it applies to the military generally, see Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 
5. See also Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice7, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 853; Note, Denial of Military Jurisdiction over Servicemen's Crimes 
Having No Military Significance and Cognizable in Civilian Courts, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 
930 (1970). 
10. These are offenses under the UCMJ arts. 80, 130, 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, 934 
(1964). 
11. United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967). 
12. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966). 
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.13 The Supreme Court 
then granted certiorari to consider the limited issues: 
Does a court-martial ... have jurisdiction to tty a member of the 
Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable 
in a civilian court and having no military significance, alleged to 
have been committed off post and while on leave, thus depriving 
him of his constitutional rights to indictment by grand jury and trial 
by a petit jury in a civilian court?14 
In deciding this question, the Court in O'Callahan emphasized 
that the military court-martial lacked important procedural provi-
sions. The Court concluded that the advantages of a grand jury 
indictment and of trial by jury were not to be denied inexorably to 
members of the armed forces, but rather that the authority of the 
military to take jurisdiction is limited to situations in which the 
denial of such protections is based on the "special needs of the 
military."15 Hence, the Court established the "service-connected" 
test. In so reversing the petitioner's conviction, Justice Douglas stated 
that certain of the facts incident to O'Callahan's crimes removed 
those offenses from the scope of service-connection and therefore 
placed them beyond the limits of the military's judicial competence. 
Justice Douglas then enumerated those facts: 
In the present case petitioner was properly absent from his mili-
tary base when he committed the crimes with which he is charged. 
There ·was no connection-not even the remotest one-between his 
military duties and the crimes in question. The crimes were not com-
mitted on a military post or enclave; nor was the person whom he 
attacked performing any duties relating to the military. Moreover, 
Hawaii, the situs of the crime, is not an armed camp under military 
control, as are some of our far-flung outposts. 
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority 
l!I. United States ex -rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968). 
14. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968). 
15. !195 U.S. at 262·67, 272-73. 
It should be noted at this point, however, that there may be some confusion as to 
the exact basis of the Court's objection in O'Callahan to the procedural adequacy of 
courts-martial. While the objection is specifically declared to be founded on the desire 
to pre~erve the~e "two important constitutional guarantees"-that is, the rights to 
grand-jury indictment and trial by jury-395 U.S. at 273, the majority opinion devoted 
substantial effort to demonstrating that not only do military courts deny these two 
specific constitutional safeguards, but also that they are consituted and conducted in 
such a way as to make them "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of 
constitutional law," which are essential to the implementation of a fair trial. 395 U.S. 
at 265. Thus, while the case might, at first blush, be considered as resting merely on 
the denial of the rights to grand-jury indictment and jury trial, it appears that the 
Court relied, at least to some extent, on the inherent infirmities of military tribunals 
as guarantors of a "fair trial" as that term is understood in the civilian courts. See 
Nelson &: We~tbrook, supra note 5, at 34 n.167. 
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stemming from the war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses 
were committed within our territorial limits, not in the occupied 
zone of a foreign country. The offenses did not involve any question 
of the flouting of military authority, the security of a military post, 
or the integrity of military property.10 
As is lamented by Justice Harlan in his dissent,17 the majority 
opinion has, by this enumeration, failed to illuminate to any mean-
ingful extent the general criteria for determining when an offense 
is service-connected. Instead, the listed factors, hinged as they are 
on the specific facts of the case, suggest at best only particular 
situations which indicate an absence of military significance. None-
theless, it seems that if any meaningful principles for the future 
application of O'Callahan are to emerge from the decision, they will 
have to be gleaned from the implications of these factors. In this 
connection, two commentators have suggested that to require strict 
adherence to these specific factors in every case in order to support 
a finding of no service-connection would be effectively to emasculate 
the thrust of O'Callahan by limiting its application to situations in 
which the facts involved are substantially similar to the facts of 
O'Callahan.18 The correct approach, therefore, should not be one 
of viewing each factor as absolute and indispensible but rather as 
one of enlisting these factors as aids or weighing elements in the 
determination of whether the particular crime in question is suffi-
ciently related to the military that it can justify trial in military 
courts.19 
In order to utilize these factors as meaningful indicators of 
whether military jurisdiction should attach, it is necessary to under-
stand the underlying concern that was intended to be encompassed 
by the term "service-connected." As is noted specifically by the 
majority opinion in O'Callahan; the justification for the implemen-
tation of a specialized system of military courts is derived from the 
concept of the "special needs of the military."2° Furthermore, the 
general thrust of the opinion indicates a concern for the diminution 
of liberty that is perpetrated by an expansion of jurisdiction beyond 
the extent required by military exigencies. Thus, the requirement 
that there be a finding of service-connection in order to warrant the 
imposition of military jurisdiction seems to embrace the notion that 
the term "service-connected" embodies an assurance that the crime 
16. 395 U.S. at 2i3-74. 
17. 395 U.S. at 274-75. 
18. Nelson&: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 26. 
19. In this connection, see Nelson &: Vvestbrook, supra note 5, at 29-32, suggesting a 
"multi-factor" approach to the determination of service-connection. 
20. 395 U.S. at 265. 
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in issue is of sufficient military significance to create a special mili-
tary need for the disposition of the matter within the military system. 
In light of this concern for special needs, it appears that the function 
of the enunciated factors is to focus attention in the particular case 
on the underlying need of the military for acquiring jurisdiction. 
Thus, while the factors may be used as guidelines in the determina-
tion of service-connection, they should not become ends in themselves. 
II. THE "SERVICE-CONNECTED" TEST A.BROAD: SCOPE OF THE 
PROBLEM 
As indicated previously, the purpose of this Note is to examine 
the O' Callahan holding in the context of the problems peculiar to 
its application outside of the territorial confines of the United States. 
To isolate these particular problems, this Note will assume that the 
crime or offense in question is sufficiently unrelated to the military 
that under O'Callahan it would clearly be outside of the scope of 
military jurisdiction but for the fact that it was committed by a 
serviceman while serving in a foreign country. Thus, it is to be ac-
cepted in the discussion of any problem throughout this Note that 
all of the O'Callahan factors necessary to obviate military jurisdiction 
have been satisfied except those which relate to the fact that the 
crime was committed beyond the territorial limits of the United 
States. For example, it can be assumed that the offense was committed 
off-post, while the offender was out of uniform, and that the alleged 
crime had no connection whatsoever with the offender's military 
duties. Moreover, because the present discussion concerns a peace-
time situation, two other factors which might otherwise apply in a 
foreign setting can also be considered inapplicable: it can be assumed 
that the offense in question was not committed either in "an armed 
camp under military control, as are some of our far-flung outposts"21 
or "in the occupied zone of a foreign country."22 These last two 
factors are rendered inapplicable by delineating the present scope 
of analysis to include only those powers of Congress that may be ex-
ercised in times of peace for the general implementation of "military 
justice"; excluded are those powers involved in situations of "martial 
law" and those exercisable under the "war powers."23 
It seems clear, then, that the single factor emerging from the 
O' Callahan decision which does not support the immediate denial of 
21. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
22. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
23. For discussions of the differences among military law or justice, the law of war, 
and martial law, and of the various constitutional powers under which each is invoked, 
see Everett, Military Jurisdiction over Civilians, 1960 DUKE L.J. 366-70; Girard, The 
Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. R.Ev. 461, 463 (1961); Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5, 
at 52-55. 
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military jurisdiction in the foreign context is that the "[c]ivil courts 
[may not be] open."24 If military jurisdiction is denied and no 
adequate alternative civilian tribunal is available, the offense may 
go unpunished; such a situation could have adverse effects on mili-
tary discipline and could lead to potential conflicts with the govern-
ment and people of the host state. If a civilian court is available, 
however, so that the offender may be prosecuted and punished, the 
fear of unrestrained criminal activity is largely eradicated. It may 
become necessary, therefore, in order to avert the attachment of 
military jurisdiction, to demonstrate the availability of an adequate 
alternative tribunal which can dispose of the offense involved and 
can thereby fulfill the military's special needs to preserve discipline 
and to maintain amicable relations with the host nation. 
III. ALTERNATIVE CIVILIAN COURTS AS AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT 
Before turning to the question of the accessibility of alternative 
fora, it is important to examine the underlying assumption that such 
an alternative is an absolute prerequisite to the evasion of the 
military's jurisdictional grasp. As stated above, this assumption is 
founded on the notion that the military's needs for maintaining 
internal discipline and favorable relations with the host state are 
sufficient grounds to justify the imposition of a military trial when 
no civilian courts are available, even though the offense in question 
is otherwise unrelated to the military. Thus, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether this conception is a valid basis for vesting an offense 
otherwise independent of the military with a sufficient military con-
nection that court-martial jurisdiction is proper. I£ such a basis is in-
adequate to justify a military trial, the issue of available alternatives 
becomes moot and the attachment of military jurisdiction is effec-
tively precluded. 
In its consideration of cases involving the O'Callahan doctrine, 
the United States Court of Military Appeals has apparently held that 
alternative civilian courts are indispensible to the frustration of 
military jurisdiction. In the initial case construing O'Callahan, the 
military court, in holding that the military is without jurisdiction 
to try a soldier for crimes committed off-post, while off duty, and 
against civilians, emphasized that in no fewer than eight instances 
did Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan refer to the availability 
of civilian courts.25 From this fact the Court of Military Appeals 
24. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
25. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 549, 40 C.M:.R. 257 (1969): 
The grant of certiorari itself refers to crimes cognizable " 'in a civilian court' " 
and accused's right to " 'trial by a petit jury in a civilian court,'" [O'Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U.S. at 261]; the opinion adverts to the practices "obtaining in the 
regular courts," id., page 265; to a "civilian trial," id., page 266; to "the 'Ordinary 
Process of Law,'" id., page 269; to "civil, not military courts,'' id., page 270; to 
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concluded that if no service-connection can be found, the defendant 
"is to be relegated to the civil authorities."26 This basic attitude, 
stressing the reliance on civilian courts to dispose of matters so ex-
cluded from military cognizance, has been crystallized in subsequent 
decisions of the military court construing O'Callahan.27 Typical of 
this attitude is the court's broad declaration in United States v. 
Keaton that "[ e ]ssential to this holding [that a court-martial is 
without jurisdiction] is the fact that the crime must be cognizable 
in the civil courts of the United States. . . ."28 Thus, it appears 
that the approach adopted by the highest military tribunal absolutely 
requires the availability of an alternative civilian court in order to 
overcome the military's special needs. 
The Court of Military Appeals is not, of course, the final ex-
positor of the issue.20 Nevertheless, its conclusions are relevant since 
it is the tribunal which will probably formulate the present operating 
standards for the "service-connected" test;30 and it is likely that if 
these standards are at all acceptable within the evolving framework 
of the O'Callahan doctrine, the Supreme Court, as newly constituted, 
will be reluctant to encroach further on military jurisdiction.31 The 
"trials ••• in civil courts,'' id., page 271; and to the "[c]ivil courts" as being open, 
id., at page 273 (emphasis supplied). Finally, the Court decided that, "since peti-
tioner's crimes were not service connected, he could not be tried by court-martial 
but rather was entitled to trial by the civilian courts." Id., at page 274. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
26. 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 549. 
27. See, e.g., the following decisions in which the availability of alternative civilian 
courts is listed as a factor leading to the conclusion that the military courts are without 
jurisdiction: United States v. McGonical, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 41 C.M.R. 94 (1969); United 
States v. Salford, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 33, 41 C.M.R. 33 (1969); United States v. Armes, 19 
U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969); United States v. Armstrong, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 5, 41 
C.M.R. 5 (1969); United States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969); 
United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605, 40 C.M.R. 317 (1969); United States v. 
Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969); United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 
598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969); United States v. Chandler, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 593, 40 C.M.R. 305 
(1969); United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969). 
28. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 65, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). 
29. Since the issue is a constitutional one, the ultimate authority for determining 
it lies in the United States Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
30. Since further interpretation of O'Callahan will take place in a military context, 
it is in that area that future cases will arise and consequently final exposition within 
the military will be made by the Court of Military Appeals. Interpretation of O'Cal-
lahan by the military court has already preceded such disposition in the federal district 
courts. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text. 
!11. At the time of the decision in O'Callahan, Justice Fortas had resigned, leaving 
only eight Justices to render the decision. There were five Justices constituting the 
majority-Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Marshall, and Chief Justice Warren. Since 
that time, Chief Justice Warren's resignation has been accepted and Chief Justice 
Burger has succeeded him to the bencl1. At present, no one has been confirmed as a 
successor to Justice Fortas' seat. It is to be noted that Chief Justice Burger has ex-
pressed less than a receptive attitude toward limiting military jurisdiction. See his 
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military court's holdings with regard to civilian alternatives, how-
ever, appear to have been based merely on the literal language of 
O'Callahan and do not seem to have made any meaningful analysis 
of the underlying concepts.32 Thus, in light of the limited conclusive-
ness of the military court's decisions, and in light of the somewhat 
sketchy analysis which it employed, it becomes necessary to ascertain 
whether the Court of Military Appeals' absolute requirement for 
an alternative civilian forum is an acceptable consequence of O' Cal-
lahan. 
The series of Supreme Court decisions from which O'Callahan 
can fairly be said to have descended33 may arguably be seen as 
support for the proposition that alternative fora are not absolutely 
necessary to divest the military of jurisdiction over crimes committed 
by servicemen outside of the United States. This line of cases, com-
monly referred to as the "Reid line," in effect prohibited the military 
from taking jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians accom-
panying the armed forces abroad.34 The crimes involved in those 
cases, like that in O'Callahan, were committed in foreign countries 
and at least implicitly involved the question whether there were 
alternative courts in which the crimes could be tried. The Supreme 
Court, however, was not compelled to discuss at any length the 
problem of alternative tribunals, even though the inescapable result 
was that the offenses involved went unpunished.35 Instead, the Court 
apparently was concerned only with the fact that the civilians who 
had committed the crimes did not possess the requisite status as 
members of the armed forces. Although the effect on discipline in 
these cases would admittedly have been less severe than it was in 
O'Callahan, there nonetheless was at least some justification for 
military jurisdiction in the Reid line of cases, since an adverse effect 
on relations with the host country might have resulted from allowing 
dissent as a judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1958), afjd., 
361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
32. See, e.g., the analysis of the court in United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 
41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). The decision of the issue in this case was not necessary to the 
disposition of the case. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 67. See also United States v. l3orys, 18 
U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969), and the cases listed in note 27 supra. 
33. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham 
v. Haten, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. l (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 
11 (1955). The importance of these cases to the decision of O'Callahan is exemplified 
by the extensive reference to them in the opinion. 395 U.S. at 262-67. 
34. In Quarles, the military was denied jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman even for 
crimes committed while he was in the military. 
35. See Duke &: Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem 
of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 435-38 (1960). According to former 
Chief Justice Warren, however, the Court apparently was not totally insensitive to the 
problems created by the restriction of court-martial jurisdiction. Warren, The Bill 
of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 195 (1962). 
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the crimes to go unpunished. It appears, however, that the Court 
was largely unconcerned with the satisfaction of the military's special 
needs thus created by its decisions. By permitting the crimes com-
mitted in those cases to go uncorrected, the Court seems to have 
indicated that, even when civil courts are not accessible, these special 
needs of the military are not sufficiently persuasive to justify the 
extension of military jurisdiction to crimes committed by civilians. 
Despite the Court's apparent indifference in the past toward the 
unavailability of alternative courts for the prosecution of the crimes 
in these analogous situations, Justice Douglas emphasized in the 
O'Callahan opinion that the availability of alternative civilian courts 
was a crucial consideration in determining service-connection.36 This 
apparent departure from precedent can, however, be explained by 
the differences in the bases of analysis in each respective situation. 
With respect to crimes committed by civilians, apparently no amount 
of special needs may confer jurisdiction on the military tribunals, 
because the crucial determination in that situation is merely whether 
the offender possesses the requisite status as a member of the armed 
forces.37 In the analysis of offenses by servicemen, however, such 
status has already been ascertained and-the question is one of mili-
tary need. Since the consideration of alternative fora as an element 
in the determination of service-connection stems from the concept 
of special military need, it appears that in the area of crimes com-
mitted by civilians, in which the military's special needs are ir-
relevant, the availability of alternative fora is likewise irrelevant. 
Consequently, the distinction in status between a civilian and a 
serviceman seems to preclude the use of the Reid line to argue that 
an adequate alternative forum is not a prerequisite to depriving the 
military of jurisdiction. 
Thus, in light of the frequent mention in O'Callahan of available 
civilian tribunals, in light of the emphasis which the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has placed on the availability of these tribunals, and 
in light of the very real need to control discipline both within the 
military structure and within the foreign host nation, it does not 
seem improvident to conclude that the availability of a civilian 
disciplinary tribunal is absolutely required in order to remove the 
offense in question from the realm of military jurisdiction. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS 
The location of the crime in a foreign nation raises a supple-
mentary issue which must be examined prior to undertaking an 
analysis of what alternative civilian tribunals are available. That 
!16. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
!17. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. See also Latney v. Ignatious, 416 F.2d 
821 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (strictly construing the dicta in O'Callahan that civilians may 
never be tried in military courts); Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 54-55. 
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further issue is prompted by the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) 
which are in effect between the United States and virtually every 
nation in which American troops are stationed.38 
The SOFA which has been in effect for the longest period of time, 
and the one which has served as a model for most other SOF As, 
is the NATO SOFA.89 The NATO SOFA provides that jurisdiction 
over crimes committed in foreign countries by members of visiting 
forces be allocated between the sending and receiving states. The 
agreement confers on each respective government exclusive juris-
diction over crimes which are cognizable under that government's 
law, but which are not cognizable under the law of the other na-
tion.40 Over all other crimes, concurrent jurisdiction by both the 
sending and receiving states is recognized, with primary-or first-
choice-jurisdiction designated according to specified criteria. Under 
these criteria, the host state is vested with primary jurisdiction over 
all such offenses unless (a) the offense is "solely against the property 
or security of [the sending] State, or [is] solely against the person or 
property of another member of the force or civilian component of that 
State or of a dependent," or (b) the offense arises out of the "per-
formance of official duty. "41 
38. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regard-
ing the Status of Their Forces [hereinafter NATO SOFA], June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 
U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2845 (effective Aug. 23, 1953); Agreement Concerning the 
Status of United States Forces in Australia, May 9, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.R. 506, T.I.A.S. 
No. 5394 (effective May 9, 1963), as amended, July 12, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6527; Agree-
ment with the Republic of China on the Status of United States Armed Forces in the 
Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1965, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 373, T.I.A.S. No. 5968 (effective 
April 12, 1966); Agreement Under Art. VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security with Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in 
Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510 (effective June 23, 1960); 
Agreement Under Art. IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea 
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the 
Republic of Korea, July 9, 1966, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127 (effective 
Feb. 9, 1967). For a general discussion of Status of Forces Agreements [hereinafter 
SOFA], see Carlisle, Offidal Duty Certificates Under Status of Forces Agreements, 20 
JAG J. 95 (1966). 
39. See note 38 supra. This is the SOFA existing between the United States and 
every NATO nation in which the United States has troops stationed. Since SOFAs in 
effect with countries other than NATO countries are based largely on this NATO 
SOFA, this agreement should be considered as in effect throughout the remainder of 
this Note, except when otherwise designated. 
40. NATO SOFA art. VII, 1f 2: 
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to e.x-
ercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State 
with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, punishable by 
the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving state. 
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise ex-
clusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their de-
pendents with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of 
that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State. 
41. NATO SOFA art. VII, 1f 3: 
In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules 
shall apply: 
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These standards established by the NATO SOFA are obviously 
meant to allow the military authorities of the sending state to retain 
control over offenses relating primarily to military matters. They 
seem to coincide, at least partially, with the standards articulated by 
Justice Douglas for establishing service-connection.42 Although the 
similarities between the two standards are less than complete, it 
seems that, by following the SOFA provisions, the United States 
has been practicing a form of the "service-connected" test ever 
since the adoption of the NATO SOFA in 1953. The question 
emerging from these similarities is whether the differences between 
the two sets of standards are sufficiently immaterial to make feasible 
the satisfaction of the O'Callahan requirements merely by applica-
tion of the NATO SOFA provisions. A finding of sufficient cor-
relation in this regard would make largely irrelevant any further 
discussion concerning the availability of alternative tribunals, be-
cause the existing SOFA system, which is apparently constitutionally 
valid,43 would operate to alleviate the concerns encompassed by such 
a discussion. 
There are several objections to utilizing the NATO SOFA in 
this manner. The United States, under the NATO SOFA, has re-
tained concurrent juisdiction over a wide range of offenses and has, 
as a matter of course, requested waiver of jurisdiction by the host 
state in almost all cases.44 Moreover, the host state is under no 
compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction, and in fact it is often reluc-
tant to do so, especially when the crimes are primarily against Amer-
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to 
exercise jmisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in 
relation to 
(i) offenses solely against the property or security of that State, or offenses 
solely against the person or property of another member of the force or 
civilian component of that State or of a dependent; 
(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of 
official duty. 
(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of the receiving State shall have 
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. 
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it 
shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The au-
thorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration 
to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in 
cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance. 
42. See text accompanying note 16 mpra. 
43. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524- (1957). See discussion in text accompanying notes 
6·!-70 infra. 
44. See Carlisle, supra note 38, at 96; Levie, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement: 
Legal Safeguards for American Servicemen, 44 A.B.A.J. 322 (1958). The NATO SOFA 
provides for the recognition of such waivers: 
The authorities of the State having the primary right [to jurisdiction] shall give 
sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State 
for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to 
be of particular importance. 
Art. VII, 1f 3(c). 
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ican citizens or property or otherwise inimical to American interests.4 i; 
If the NATO SOFA should be applied instead of the O'Callahan 
"service-connected" test, such waivers of jurisdiction would greatly 
increase the scope of American military jurisdiction, thereby frus-
trating the primary aim of O' Callahan. Even if this increased scope 
of military jurisdiction could be eliminated by simply abandoning 
the waiver requests, there would still persist a "jurisdictional gap" 
caused by the failure of local authorities to prosecute.46 Under the 
"special needs" approach, it does not seem that foreign relations 
would be damaged by such a failure to prosecute, since the foreign 
nation could not realistically complain about disruptive behavior 
that is occasioned by its mrn failure to acquire jurisdiction. None-
theless, internal disciplinary problems in the military would remain. 
Furthermore, foreign relations could quite conceivably be damaged 
by the increased burden placed on local foreign courts by the sudden 
abandonment of waiver requests. While there are difficulties in 
evaluating empirically the effects of attempting to implement O'Cal-
lahan by utilizing the SOFAs,47 it appears from this cursory analysis 
that many of the practical problems which the "service-connected" 
test is intended to remedy could be expected to persevere as a result 
of the application of the NA TO SOFA provisions. 
Moreover, it appears that in practice the determination of a 
military connection under the existing provisions of the SOF As has 
not rested on particularly meaningful criteria. This inefficient ap-
plication of the SOFA provisions has resulted largely from the 
indiscriminate issuance by military commanders of "official duty 
certificates."48 The history behind the negotiation of the NA TO 
SOFA indicates that as differences between nations arose concerning 
the proper allocation of jurisdiction in particular cases, the deter-
mination by the sending state that the crime was committed by the 
serviceman in the performance of an "official duty" was to take 
precedence, with areas of grave differences to be decided by diplo-
matic resolution.49 In carrying out this function, some American 
military commanders have developed the practice of issuing certifi-
cates of official duty somewhat indiscriminately and without for-
mulating any distinct bases for their decisions. As a result, recourse 
45. See Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the United States Armed 
Forces Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the Jurisdictional Gap?, 36 GEO. 
WASH. L. R.Ev. 273, 276-80 (1967). See also Girard, supra note 23, at 505-06. 
46. See discussion of the jurisdictional gap in text accompanying note 98 infra. 
47. A full-scale empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the 
data compiled in Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, and its analysis at 276-78, may be of some 
assistance in making such an evaluation. 
48. See Carlisle, supra note 38; Ward, Criminal Law and Jurisdiction over Amer-
ican Servicemen in Japan, 52 A.B.A.J. 61, 62 (1966). 
49. Carlisle, supra note 38, at 96. 
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to diplomatic channels has often been required, and the smooth 
functioning of the SOFA provisions has accordingly been impaired.150 
While in some instances mechanisms for handling these disputes 
efficiently have developed,61 it seems that the SOFA provisions, as 
presently employed, may be expected only to approximate the 
O' Callahan standards. Although reform in the operation of the 
system appears to be long overdue,62 an unrestricted recommendation 
of the NATO SOFA as a method of effecting the "service-connected" 
standards of O'Callahan must await the implementation and scrutini-
zation of such reforms. 
V. FOREIGN CIVILIAN COURTS AS AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE 
TRIBUNALS 
Having disposed of the preliminary issues, the focus of attention 
may now be turned to the question of the availability of alternative 
civilian courts. Since the absolute requirement for an alternative 
tribunal is founded on the proposition that such courts are necessary 
to obviate the military's special needs of preserving discipline and 
maintaining favorable relations with the host state, it follows that 
in order for the alternative tribunal invoked to supply a satisfactory 
basis for the denial of court-martial jurisdiction, that tribunal must 
be constituted so as to satisfy these military needs. Thus, the re-
quirement that an alternative forum be available in order to justify 
the frustration of military jurisdiction seems to contemplate more 
than a theoretical alternative. It seems also to require a tribunal 
that is competent to meet the special military needs and thereby to 
remove the necessity of disciplinary judicial procedures within the 
military. The approach to be followed, therefore, in the analysis of 
the alternative-forum issue, must include not only the initial search 
for available civilian courts, but also an examination of the abilities 
of such courts to fulfill the special needs of the military. 
In the initial search for potential alternative courts, the tribunal 
that emerges from the NATO SOFA's allocations of jurisdiction 
as most obvious is the civilian court system of the host country. For 
all but that narrow range of offenses over which the United States 
has retained exclusive jurisdiction,53 the SOFA provisions call either 
for exclusive jurisdiction in the host country or for concurrent 
jurisdiction in the host and sending countries.54 Thus, it appears 
50. Id. 
51. In Japan, for example, when notice is given by Japanese officials of their 
nonconcurrence in American determinations of official duty, the issue is submitted for 
resolution to a joint committee composed of high-ranking American and Japanese 
officials. See Ward, supra note 48, at 62. 
52. See Carlisle, supra note 38. 
53. See the NATO SOFA provisions at note 40 supra. 
54. See the NATO SOFA provisions at notes 40-41 supra. 
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that these foreign tribunals are readily available for the prosecution 
of crimes unrelated to military service. 
Prior to an examination of the internal qualifications of these 
courts, it must be determined whether these foreign tribunals fall 
within the range of civilian courts that was contemplated by the 
language of O' Callahan or whether that opinion limits the acceptable 
range of choices to courts within the United States. Since the majority 
opinion in O'Callahan referred only to "civilian courts" ·without 
specifying any particular tribunals as acceptable, ms there emerges 
from the decision no apparent reason for restricting the acceptable 
alternatives to American tribunals. Indeed, the Court of Military 
Appeals, in its decision in United States v. Borys/•6 stressed that 
Justice Douglas had written of civilian courts in contrast to military 
courts; and it thereby implied that foreign civilian courts might fall 
within the range of acceptable alternatives.157 The military court, 
however, has subsequently retreated from this potentially liberal in-
terpretation of O'Callahan58 and has stated in United States v. 
Keaton59 that in order to negate court-martial jurisdiction, it is 
essential that the offense "be cognizable in the civil courts of the 
United States, ... and that such courts be open and functioning."60 
This restrictive interpretation by the Court of Military Appeals has 
apparently stemmed from the conclusion that foreign courts are 
procedurally inadequate to supplant military jurisdiction, because 
they fail to guarantee the "benefits of indictment and trial by jury."61 
The military court reasoned that, since a similar failure had been 
the basis of the objection to the military court-martial in O'Callahan, 
a tribunal providing equally deficient procedures could not serve as 
a viable alternative. In light of the special-needs rationale of the 
"service-connected" test, however, it is not readily apparent what mili-
tary exigencies are satisfied by the imposition of this limitation on 
acceptable alternative courts. Nonetheless, the indisputable logic of 
the Court of Military Appeals persists. Because the military court's 
statement in Keaton concerning alternative tribunals was not neces-
55. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
56. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). See note 25 supra and accompanying 
text. 
57. 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 549. 
58. While the language quoted seems to indicate the liberality of the coun in 
Borys, placing that language in the context of the entire opinion may cast doubts on 
the validity of this conclusion. 
59. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). Accord, United States v. Blackwell, 19 
U.S.C.M.A. 196, 41 C.M.R. 196 (1970); United States v. Bryan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 184, 41 
C.M.R. 184 (1970); United States v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 41 C.M.R. 68 (1969); 
United States v. Stevenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 69, 41 C.M.R. 69 (1969). 
60. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 65. 
61. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 67. 
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sary to the decision,62 and because the implication of that statement 
would place a severe restriction on the application of O' Callahan to 
crimes committed by servicemen in foreign countries, it is essential 
to examine the validity of the military court's conclusion.63 
A. The Need To Examine Comparative Procedures 
At the outset it should be asked whether a comparison of the 
procedures of foreign courts with those of courts in the United States 
is a relevant aspect of the "service-connected" test. As noted by the 
Court of Miliarty Appeals, O'Callahan is based on the determination 
that the American court-martial is procedurally deficient and there-
fore should be denied jurisdiction over the prosecution of crimes 
so long as no special military necessities outweigh this inherent 
procedural incompetency. From this basis for decision develops the 
initial tendency to follow the military court's approach which re-
quires that a procedurally superior court be available if the court 
martial is to be denied. The emphasis of past Supreme Court deci-
sions, however, seems to suggest that this preoccupation with com-
parative procedures is not an appropriate component of the analysis. 
The O'Callahan opinion itself, as supported by the conclusions 
of the Reid line of cases,64 indicates an apparent disregard for the 
procedural adequacy of alternative courts. While the Court has ex-
pressed in these cases its dissatisfaction with the procedural guar-
antees provided by the military courts, 65 it has voiced no correspond-
ing concern for rights available in alternative courts. 66 The Court 
seems to be more concerned with imposing restrictions on the ex-
tension of military jurisdiction than with ensuring a procedurally 
competent tribunal for the trial of the accused. 
The argument that the procedural adequacy of foreign courts 
need not be examined is supported by at least one other important 
62. In Keaton, the crime committed was of a type that had previously been deter-
mined to be service-connected, and consequently court-martial jurisdiction was estab-
lished. Although the court recognized that it could "leave the matter there," 19 
U.S.C.M.A. at 67, it nonetheless advanced the dicta that foreign courts are not ac-
ceptable alternatives. 
6!1. This Note will examine the procedural adequacy of foreign courts only insofar 
as those courts may serve as a basis for restricting military jurisdiction. No attempt 
will be made to examine foreign courts for the purpose of passing judgment on the 
propriety of granting those courts original jurisdiction over American servicemen. 
64. See note 33 supra. 
65. See, e.g., the quote from Quarles cited in note 5 supra. 
66. A forceful argument can be made, however, that the Reid cases are distinguish-
able because they involved status rather than service-connection. See text accompany-
ing note 34 supra. Furthermore, there would seem to have been no need for Justice 
Douglas to mention specifically the adequacy of procedures in O'Callahan, since the 
result of the denial of court-martial jurisdiction in that case was that the petitioner 
then became subject to the jurisdiction of a federal district court. 
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Supreme Court decision. In that case, Wilson v. Girard,67 the Court 
upheld a SOFA which provided for the waiver of jurisdiction by 
the United States over American military personnel serving in 
Japan. Indeed, the mere existence of the SOFA provisions, with 
their allocations of criminal jurisdiction to the courts of foreign 
nations, seems to indicate an acceptance by the United States of 
the courts of these countries as permissible tribunals in which to 
prosecute American offenders. 68 This inference is strengthened by 
the decision in Girard, in which it was held constitutional for the 
United States to waive its claim of primary jurisdiction in a case 
over which it held concurrent jurisdiction with Japan, even though 
such a waiver would surrender the accused soldier to Japanese au-
thorities for trial.69 Both the SOFAs and the Girard decision, then, 
serve to sustain the conclusion gleaned from O'Callahan and the 
Reid line that comparing procedures is irrelevant. 
The decision in Girard was based on the holding that a "sovereign 
nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws 
committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly con-
sents to surrender its jurisdiction,"70 and that since Japan had re-
tained concurrent jurisdiction over the crimes involved, the waiver 
provision was constitutional as applied. There was no discussion of 
the procedural safeguards afforded by the Japanese tribunals, much 
less a comparison of Japanese procedural guarantees with those con-
stitutionally mandated in the United States; rather, the decision 
seems to have been on the above-stated broader principles of inter-
national law. Thus, it appears from the reasoning of Wilson v. 
67. 354 U.S. 524 (1957). 
68. It should be noted that the NATO SOFA seeks to guarantee an accused at 
least some degree of procedural fairness in foreign courts. Art. VII, 1f 9 provides: 
Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prose-
cuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled 
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial; 
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made 
against him; 
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are 
within the jurisdiction of the receiving State; 
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free 
or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time 
being in the receiving State; 
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; 
and 
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State 
and, when rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at 
his trial. 
69. The Japanese SOFA, Protocol To Amend Art. XVII of the Administrative 
Agreement Under Art. III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America 
and Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848, is substantially simi-
lar, in all relevant respects, to the comparable provisions of the NATO SOFA. 
70. 354 U.S. at 529. This issue was considered a difficult one prior to this per curiam 
decision. See Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw. 
U. L REv. 349 (1955). 
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Girard that the adequacy of foreign procedural safeguards is to be 
considered irrelevant and that the Supreme Court has by negative 
implication accepted foreign civil courts, as restricted by the pro-
cedural guarantees of the SOFAs,71 as valid alternatives to trial by 
military authorities. 
Perhaps more important than the literal support provided by these 
cases is the fact that the concept of the irrelevancy of alternative pro-
cedures seems to be consistent with the special-needs rationale for 
applying the "service-connected" test of O'Callahan. It appears that 
no overwhelming need of the military is satisfied by the presence of 
constitutional safeguards in the foreign tribunals. Indeed, fear of 
prosecution in procedurally unfair foreign tribunals could have a 
deterrent effect upon criminal acts and could thereby enhance disci-
pline. While it is true that flagrant violations of the basic right of 
an accused might arguably have a depressing effect on morale, it 
must be remembered that, at the present time, certain minimal safe-
guards must be provided in foreign courts, pursuant to the Status of 
Forces Agreements.72 Thus, in light of the practicalities of the present 
situation, military expediency does not appear to require a determi-
nation of the adequacy of the safeguards provided in those courts. 
In summary, the emerging attitude of the Supreme Court concerning 
the irrelevancy of comparative procedures, the apparent constitu-
tional validity of the waiver of jurisdiction under the SOFA provi-
sions, and the compatability of the special-needs standards with trial 
in foreign courts, all serve to create a strong argument that a com-
parison of foreign procedures with those provided by the military is 
not a necessary part of the "service-connected" test. 
Despite the force of these contentions, however, several particu-
larly persuasive practical considerations militate against the results 
suggested by the above discussion. First, an anomaly is created by 
failing to undertake a comparison of procedural rights. The Court 
in O'Callahan seems to have determined that whenever the crime 
involved bears no relationship to the military, a court-martial is in 
derogation of the accused's specific constitutional rights to a grand-
jury indictment and to trial by jury. Yet in such circumstances a for-
eign tribunal becomes the forum in which the offender is fried; and 
even though the decision in Wilson v. Girard apparently recognized 
trial in foreign courts as an acceptable alternative to a military 
trial,78 these tribunals nonetheless frequently deny these same spe-
cific rights.74 Thus, the offender is put into the seemingly anomalous 
position of being denied one forum solely because it fails to provide 
71. See note 68 supra, spelling out these procedural protections. 
72. Id. 
73, See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra. 
74, See Schwenk Comparative Study of the Law of Criminal Procedure in NATO 
Cottntries Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 35 N.C. L. REV. 358 (1957). 
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the necessary procedural safeguards, and being placed into another 
forum which may fail to provide the same safeguards. If the denial 
of these two specific rights-grand-jury indictment and trial by jury 
-is considered to be the basis for limiting military jurisdiction, it is 
unclear what rights of the accused are being protected by such a 
limitation when the accused will be denied the same rights regardless 
of the forum utilized. 
If the O'Callahan decision can be considered to rest not on the 
fact that a court-martial may deny an accused specifically enumerated 
rights, but rather on the broader grounds of the inherent inability 
of military tribunals to provide a trial that is fundamentally fair,7G 
less of an enigma is created. Under such an interpretation, it appears 
that while the procedures employed in the foreign courts may not 
conform to the specifications of the American Constitution, they 
would nevertheless be subject to an analysis of fairness of the result-
ing trials. Even if the decision is deemed to have been based on these 
broader grounds, however, concern for the rights of the accused seems 
to require an examination of the foreign courts in order to ensure 
that they can provide the fair trial that the military has been ad-
judged incapable of guaranteeing. 
Thus, in many circumstances, there is a seemingly irreconcilable 
conflict between the desire to contain military jurisdiction within its 
permissible sphere and the inability to protect the procedural rights 
of the accused by so limiting the military's jurisdiction. From this 
conflict emerges the question whether the often negligible advantages 
gained by restricting court-martial jurisdiction can in a particular 
country justify that restriction. In the absence of a comparison of 
procedures in order to determine the extent of protection afforded 
to the accused in each system, the denial of court-martial jurisdiction 
for the mere sake of restricting the range of military cognizance seems 
to be a futile effort. . 
A second practical objection to the failure to investigate alterna-
tive procedures is derived from the fact that, in many instances, ser-
vicemen are in a foreign country, if not against their will, at least 
not of their mm volition. Finding themselves so situated, they find 
further that they have become subject in all their nonservice activities 
to a foreign tribunal which may offer them even fewer safeguards at 
trial than would a military tribunal. This situation is aggravated in 
the case of a draftee who not only is abroad against his will, but also 
is in the armed forces involuntarily. The inequities created by these 
circumstances call forth the basic question whether the United States 
can or should be permitted to compel its servicemen to become sub-
ject to judicial procedures not responsive to the limitations of the 
American Constitution. While the constitutionality of such a sub-
75. See note 15 supra. 
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jection has apparently been upheld by Wilson v. Girard,16 the in-
equities of practical application are not thereby remedied, and these 
bothersome ethical questions persist. 
Third, practical consideration must be given to the influence 
exerted by the Court of Military Appeals in adopting the position 
that foreign courts are not acceptable alternatives because they fail 
to provide those critical procedural safeguards found to be lacking 
in military courts.77 From this determination, it is clear that the 
Court of Military Appeals has adopted the view that O'Callahan 
rested to an extent on the availability of a constitutionally adequate 
civil court.78 While the relative importance of the military court's 
decision is not easily ascertained, it may safely be assumed that its 
holdings will not fail to exert some degree of influence on the ulti-
mate disposition of the matter79 and will thus strengthen the case for 
requiring a comparison of procedures. 
Therefore, despite the notion that the military's special needs 
do not seem to require constitutionally sufficient alternatives, and 
despite at least some case authority for the proposition that compara-
tive procedures are irrelevant to jurisdictional decisions, there are 
several serious problems presented by a proposal to divest the mili-
tary of jurisdiction without considering the constitutional adequacy 
of procedural safeguards provided by foreign civilian courts: (1) the 
anomaly of denying one court in deference to another which would 
be deemed inadequate under similar scrutinization; (2) the dubious 
propriety of compelling persons to serve in places where no consti-
tutionally adequate tribunals are available; and (3) the difficulty in 
reconciling a proposal to ignore comparative procedures with deci-
sions by the Court of Military Appeals which read O'Callahan to 
require an alternative forum that provides for the specific rights of 
grand-jury indictment and trial by jury. It seems, then, that before 
deciding to divest the military of jurisdiciton, there must be an ex-
amination of procedures afforded by the foreign courts.80 
B. Procedural Safeguards in Foreign Courts 
As is shown by the above analysis, there are formidable arguments 
both for and against requiring scrutinization of the procedural rights 
provided by alternative courts. The practical significance of this con-
frontation, however, may arguably be diminished by the existence 
76. See the discussion in text accompanying note 67 supra. 
77. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra. 
78. Id. 
79. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. 
80. In view of the additional judicial resources which would be required in order 
to undertake a meaningful comparative analysis of foreign procedures, the possibility 
exists that some courts may simply avoid difficulties by ruling in favor of military 
jurisdiction. 
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of two factors within the system of Status of Forces Agreements now 
in effect. The first factor is that the NATO SOFA and the other sim-
ilar SOFAs contain a section for certain fundamental procedural 
guarantees. The second mitigating factor is the high degree of sophis-
tication reached in the judicial procedures of many countries in 
which American troops are stationed. 
In this connection, several commentators have attempted to dem-
onstrate that the combination of these two factors has largely elimi-
nated fears of an unjust trial in a foreign court.81 1,Vhile several basic 
constitutional guarantees are omitted from the SOFA provisions,82 
objections based on these omissions are largely met by the fact that 
a "highly developed system of jurisprudence"83 prevails in many of 
the countries involved.84 Indeed, an extensive study, made in 1957, 
of comparative criminal procedures in the NA TO countries con-
cluded that the over-all protection provided in trials in those coun-
tries is "on balance equal to that granted by the U.S. Constitution."811 
Moreover, to the extent that the SOFA and existing procedures 
fail to provide adequate protection to an American accused of a 
crime in a foreign country, the United States is not helpless to protect 
him. Primary in the assurance that travesties of justice do not proceed 
unchecked is a practice that has evolved from the provision in the 
NATO SOFA which entitles an accused in a foreign court to the right 
"to communicate with a representative of the Government of the 
sending State and when the rl!les of the court permit, to have such 
a representative present at his trial."86 In American practice, the 
representative allowed under this section has been referred to as a 
"trial observer."87 Despite the theoretical possibility that the host 
nation could legally exclude the trial observer, it appears that such 
observers are rarely barred from foreign judicial proceedings88 and 
that therefore they are available for protection in the vast majority 
of cases. While it has been suggested that trial observers could be 
81. See Levie, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement: Legal Safeguards for American 
Servicemen, 44 A.B.A.J. 322 (1958); Ning, Due Process and the Sino-American Status of 
Forces Amendment, 17 AM. J. COMP, L. 94 (1969); Schwenk, supra note 74; Ward, 
Criminal Law and Jurisdiction over American Servicemen in Japan, 52 A.B.A.J. 61 
(1966). 
82. 99 CONG. REc. 8732 (1953) (remarks of Senator McCarran). 
83. See Re, supra note 70, at 360. 
84. See Levie, supra note 81; Re, supra note 70; Schwenk, supra note 74; ·ward, 
supra note 81. It can be contended, however, that a highly developed system of juris-
prudence, at least by American standards, exists only in '\Vestern countries. See text 
accompanying notes 109-14 infra. 
85. See Schwenk, supra note 74, at 378. 
86. NATO SOFA art. VII, ,I 9(g). See note 68 supra. 
87. Williams, An American's Trial in a Foreign Court: The Role of the Military's 
Trial Observer, 34 MILITARY L. REv. I (1966), provides an extensive study of the func-
tions of the trial observer. 
88. Levie, supra note 81, at 323-24. 
April 1970] Notes 1037 
utilized much more effectively than they are under present practice,89 
they do serve to ensure that, as a minimum, someone is present at 
the trial who is presumably trained to recognize encroachments on 
the rights of the accused and whose duty it is to report such devia-
tions to proper United States authorities in order that corrective 
steps may be taken. 00 
If deviations from the prescribed SOFA procedures are exposed, 
further measures for the rectification of these departures must be 
instituted. One obvious measure is diplomatic intervention.91 While 
this extreme measure seems to be justified to correct only the very 
serious departures from required procedures, it appears to be an 
effective tool in ensuring that those deviations are corrected. Also 
available is the provision in the NA TO SOFA which requires the 
host country with primary jurisdiction to give "sympathetic con-
sideration" to a request by the sending state for a waiver of jurisdic-
tion, so long as the sending state "considers such waiver to be of 
particular importance.''92 Therefore, in situations in which there is 
concurrent jurisdiction, this fortified request for a waiver seems to 
provide an effective safeguard against digressions from the required 
procedure. As an additional protection, the NA TO SOFA provides 
that when such waivers are denied, the military commanders are to 
seek recourse through diplomatic channels.93 Although these safe-
guards-the use of a trial observer, diplomatic intervention, and 
waiver request-do nor fulfill the standards of the United States 
Constitution, they serve at least to enhance the opportunity for an 
accused serviceman to receive a fair trial in a foreign court. 
As a practical matter, then, it appears that the combination of 
the various safeguards presented above have resulted in a generally 
operable and acceptable system and that the rights of an accused are 
not appreciably diminished in a trial in a foreign court. The judicial 
objection to that system has been virtually nonexistent;94 and when 
89. See Williams, supra note 87. 
90. Id, 
91. Girard, supra note 23, at 507 n.215. 
92. NATO SOFA art. VII, ,I 3(c), supra note 41. 
93. See Levie, supra note 81, at 322. Since the sending state has jurisdiction only 
over persons "subject to the military law of that State" [NATO SOFA art. VII, ,i l(a) 
(emphasis added)], there seems to be some question whether the United States may 
rightfully request a waiver of jurisdiction when the military courts are closed. It has 
been suggested-and it seems validly so-that even if the military courts are closed, 
jurisdiction is retained for purposes of dispensing administrative sanctions, and that 
a waiver request may be based on that jurisdiction. See Williams, supra note 87, at 17. 
Moreover, if an adequate foreign procedure is determined to be a requisite element 
of the alternative-forum requirement, military jurisdiction would be reinstated when 
the foreign court fails to provide the required procedures and the waiver request could 
be based thereon. 
94. There appear to be no recorded cases holding invalid a SOFA's allocation of 
jurisdiction. 
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the United States' toleration of foreign jurisdiction has been ques-
tioned, the constitutional validity of the SOFA provisions has been 
upheld.95 Thus, it might seem that since the system, as it has operated, 
has apparently been adjudged constitutionally acceptable, there is 
little remaining objection to the relegation of a few more servicemen 
to the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals by the application abroad of 
the "service-connected" test of O'Callahan. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of these factors in mitigating 
objections to foreign procedures has been significantly diminished 
by the relatively recent constitutional developments in the area of 
procedural due process. Before Reid, the Supreme Court had adhered 
to a subjective interpretation of what rights were fundamental to a 
fair trial; there was no necessary correlation between the rights im-
posed by the Bill of Rights on the federal government and those held 
applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.96 Indeed, the only comprehensive study concerning the 
constitutional adequacy of foreign procedures-the study which 
adopted the conclusion that foreign procedures are substantially 
equal to those exercised by the states97-was based on this interpreta-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.98 In recent years, however, it has 
been determined, by a process of selective incorporation, that certain 
of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights are a fortiori essen-
tial to a fair trial and are thereby incorporated into the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.99 Substantially all of the pro-
cedural requirements of the Bill of Rights are now considered to be 
vital to the concept of a fair trial and have been imp!Jsed on the states 
by this process.100 
95. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). 
96. The following cases are frequently cited in support of this proposition. Each 
held that a specific right imposed in federal courts by the Bill of Rights was not 
fundamental to the guarantee of a fair trial nor "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty" [Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)], so as to make it applicable to 
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment: Irvine v. Califor• 
nia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and 
seizure); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (privilege against self-incrimination); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy); Twining v. New Jersey, 
211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (trial by twelve-man jm1·); 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury). 
97. See note 85 supra and accompan}ing text. 
98. See Schwenk, supra note 74. 
99. Apparently, the first Supreme Court case adopting tl1e incorporation doctrine 
was Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964), which overruled Twining and Adamson. In 
that case, the Court held that "the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory 
self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment 
by the States." 378 U.S. at 6. For subsequent cases utilizing the doctrine, sec note 100 
infra. 
100. See the discussion of Malloy v. Hogan, 379 U.S. I (1964), in note 99 supra. See 
also the following cases making the indicated rights compulsory on the states: Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968) (right to trial by jury in criminal cases); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 
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The importance for present purposes of this change in the atti-
tude of the Supreme Court is embodied in the concept of a fair trial 
as it is applied to foreign courts. While foreign civil courts may once 
have been considered to have provided fair trials, it appears that due 
to the failure of those courts to provide for the specific guarantees 
of the American Bill of Rights, the resulting trials would not be con-
sidered fair under the recent Supreme Court interpretations. Hence, 
much of the importance of what was written about the fairness of 
treatment afforded American servicemen in foreign courts has been 
obviated by the new aspects attributed to the due process clause. 
Nonetheless, even though applicable foreign procedures may fall 
short of the recently developed constitutional standards, the impact 
of the earlier attempts of foreign countries to establish in civilian 
trials some of the basic elements of fairness remains viable to miti-
gate, at least to some degree, the inconsistencies encountered in advo-
cating the irrelevancy of investigating the procedural provisions of 
foreign courts. 
C. Acceptability of Foreign Civil Courts as Alternative Tribunals 
A comparison between trial in American military courts and that 
in foreign civilian courts leaves one, at best, with a choice between 
two constitutionally inadequate tribunals. Even where foreign legal 
systems are roughly similar to the American model, such as in the 
NA TO countries, it seems that foreign courts possess certain proce-
dural defects which render them at least as objectionable as American 
courts-martial. These constitutional infirmities are emphasized by 
the recent trend of decisions incorporating selected provisions of the 
Bill of Rights into the requirements of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Indeed, the procedural defects in foreign 
courts render those courts susceptible to the same criticism that was 
levelled at military courts in O'Callahan. The Court's objection in 
that case to military procedure rested largely on the incompetency of 
military courts to deal with the "nice subtleties of constitutional 
law";101 and it is doubtful that foreign courts, regardless of their 
basic fairness, are any more adept than are military courts at dealing 
with those "nice subtleties." Basically, then, foreign and military 
tribunals are comparable and equally inadequate. 
(right of confrontation under sixth amendment); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 
(1965) (privilege against compulsory self-incrimination-adverse comment on failure to 
testify not permitted); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence ob-
tained by unlawful search and seizure). Note that the requirement for indictment by 
grand jury has not yet been so incorporated. Thus, although the absence of this 
guarantee was a basic reason in O'Callahan for objection to the military trial, it has 
not yet been made compulsory on the states. 
IOI. 395 U.S. at 265. 
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Faced with a choice between two inadequate tribunals, the initial 
urge may be to select the foreign civilian court. The allocation of 
jurisdiction by the Status of Forces Agreements seems to provide a 
somewhat workable method for defining service-connection abroad-
a method with established channels for compromising differences of 
opinion. The provisions allowing for waiver of jurisdiction by the 
United States in deference to foreign demands have been upheld 
as constitutional,102 thereby affirming the United States' ability to 
subject its citizens to foreign trials, even though foreign courts may 
possess some procedural infirmities. Thus, this adoption of the SOFA 
assignment of jurisdiction could be a constitutionally acceptable 
method of applying the "service-connected" test of O'Callahan to 
limit military jurisdiction overseas. Moreover, the traditional ap-
proach of the Supreme Court seems to affirm this reliance on foreign 
courts as alternatives to military tribunals,103 and such an approach 
is consistent with the preservation of the military's special needs.104 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a course of action should be 
followed. Fundamental in the arguments against that approach is 
the basic inconsistency of denying one court in deference to another, 
when both offer comparable procedural safeguards. Moreover, there 
is at least some possibility of review by American civil courts to cor-
rect military courts' flagrant departures from fairness. 1015 In addition, 
denying the United States the ability to control its own servicemen 
can certainly not be expected to have any affirmative effect on the 
United States' relationship with the host nation. Indeed, there could 
be adverse effects on that relationship, since the total burden for 
prosecuting crimes unrelated to the military ,vould suddenly be 
placed on foreign authorities, and since those restraints imposed by 
the internal disciplinary structure of the armed forces would accord-
ingly be obstructed. Of course, the host country can rightfully decline 
to prosecute crimes over which it has jurisdiction,106 thereby rein-
stating military jurisdiction for want of an alternative. But to so 
permit the whims of the host government to be the basis of the at-
tachment of jurisdiction is not a favorable method of operation. 
Perhaps more important in this regard, it is questionable whether 
a serviceman-if he is going to be placed in a constitutionally defi-
cient court-should be tried in foreign courts where unfamiliar pro-
cedures and customs, language and communications problems, and 
102. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). See also text accompanying notes 63-64 
supra. 
103. See the discussion at note 64 supra. 
104. See p. 1033 supra. 
105. See generally Bishop, The Quality of Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 
1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 37. 
106. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
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the possibility of confinement in a foreign land lend considerably to 
the discomfort associated with being tried in any setting. While 
it has been shown above that these £ears may be largely exaggerated,107 
they nevertheless have been expressed by persons presumably knowl-
edgeable in the workings of international procedures.1°8 
It could perhaps be argued that there is no valid reason for pro-
viding protection from the subjective fears surrounding foreign trial 
for servicemen, because under the Reid doctrine and under standard 
principles of international law, no similar protections are furnished 
for civilians accompanying the armed forces abroad. One obvious 
answer to this argument rests on the greater degree of compulsion 
exerted by the United States in placing servicemen in the foreign 
setting. Since the accused soldier has been subjected to the foreign 
jurisdiction as a direct result of his having been commanded by the 
United States military to serve there, it seems that the same com-
manding authority should protect him from undesirable treatment. 
This point takes on added significance in the case of a draftee. While 
there is admittedly a certain degree of institutional or governmental 
coercion involved in placing on foreign soil civilians who are accom-
panying the armed forces, the compulsion in those circumstances is 
much less direct and pronounced than it is in the case of servicemen. 
In addition, there is a basic distinction between the grounds for 
denying military jurisdiction in each situation. The initial question 
in the determination of jurisdiction is one of status as a member of 
the armed forces. Since civilians fail to meet this requirement, they 
are improper subjects for a military trial. Servicemen, however, meet 
the initial status test; and consequently military jurisdiction is denied 
only when the crime is not service-connected and thus does not create 
a special need for a military trial. Since this special-need test is sub-
jective and presumably more flexible than is the status test, it is 
necessary in determining the adequacy of foreign courts as alternative 
tribunals for trying servicemen, to give more weight to the effect of 
the unfamiliar procedures and customs surrounding foreign trial. 
Finally, it should be noted that in some countries the procedural 
safeguards provided in an American court-martial are clearly superior 
to procedures used in trials in local civilian courts. Much of the pre-
ceding discussion has focused on the NA TO model and has assumed 
that foreign and military court systems are equally objectionable 
since they both fail to secure to the accused the full range of Ameri-
107. See notes 81-95 supra and accompanying text. 
108. See the objections of the late Senator McCarran, supra note 82, to the adoption 
of the NATO SOFA. See also the statement by Senator Bricker that the NATO SOFA 
"reflects a callous disregard for the rights of American Armed Forces Personnel." 99 
CONG, R!:c. 4659 (1953). See also Justice Clark's dissent in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 
89 (1957). 
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can constitutional guarantees. This assumption is somewhat inaccur-
ate, however, because it views all constitutionally deficient courts as 
equally infirm. 
There are two factors which tend to make the civil courts of some 
countries more objectionable than are military courts. The first is 
the conception that the highly lauded ability of foreign courts to 
produce fair trials is based largely on generalizations about proce-
dures practiced in those nations that are highly influenced by ·west-
ern culture.109 In areas in which Western influence is less dominant, 
however, traditional societal values relevant to the precepts of fair-
ness vary, and the approximation of American constitutional guaran-
tees is often diminished. 110 The second and more pervasive factor is 
the notion that the standards of fairness presently exercised by courts-
martial operate to provide a much more desirable tribunal than is 
indicated by the condescending attitude of Justice Douglas in O'Cal-
lahan.111 A combination of the express statutory recognition of pro-
cedural rights112 and expansive interpretations by the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals113 has greatly enhanced the basic fairness of military 
courts.114 In any given situation, therefore, either or both of the 
above factors may operate to make the military court a less objec-
tionable forum than that which is available in the particular foreign 
system. 
In summary, then, there are conflicting arguments concerning the 
acceptability of foreign civilian courts. The utilization of such courts 
as alternatives to military tribunals is strongly suggested by the mere 
existence of the SOFA allocations of jurisdiction. The constitutional 
approval of these allocations, together with the Court's traditional 
approach115 and its resulting compliance with special military exigen-
cies, weigh heavily in favor of the acceptance of foreign courts as 
viable alternatives. Even though this approach may seem appropriate 
under such a theoretical analysis, ho-wever, the relative absence of 
109. See, e.g., Schwenk, supra note 74, using as his basis of comparison the pro• 
cedures practiced in NATO nations; cf. text accompanying notes 83-85 supra. 
ll0. See generally Ning, supra note 81. 
lll. See note 5 supra, especially Nelson & Westbrook at 56-64. 
ll2. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964) (right to investigation); UCMJ 
art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (right to counsel). 
ll3. See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964) 
(right to compulsory process); United States v. Schalck, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R. 
151 (1964) (right to a speedy trial); United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 
260 (1963) (right of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); United 
States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962) (privilege against self-incrimina-
tion); United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 {1962) (right to public 
trial); United States v. Jacoby, ll U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960) (right to con-
front witnesses). 
ll4. See Nelson & 'Westbrook, supra note 5, at 56-64, enumerating those specific 
safeguards incorporated into a military trial. 
ll5. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text. 
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any practical benefits to be gained by placing servicemen in foreign 
courts weighs just as heavily against adopting foreign courts as ac-
ceptable alternative forums under the O'Callahan test. If the proce-
dural deficiencies of foreign and military courts are comparable, 
the accused gains no benefit from being tried in a foreign court. 
Indeed, the practical distress incurred by the accused in a foreign 
trial may be expected to have quite the opposite effect, and in some 
countries the court-martial is clearly the preferable forum from a 
procedural standpoint. From a consideration of these factors, there-
fore, it seems that the alternative of trial in foreign civilian courts 
should not be a permissible foundation upon which to base the 
denial of military jurisdiction. That result is easily reached by a 
literal reading of Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan, and it is 
submitted that this strict reading ought to be given. 
VJ. Al\IERICAN CIVILIAN COURTS AS AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE FORA 
Once foreign civilian courts have been examined as possible alter-
natives, the next step is to determine whether American tribunals or 
procedures are available or can be made available to eradicate the 
military's special needs and thereby to negate the necessity for imple-
menting the military's judicial apparatus in order to deal with crimes 
committed abroad which are unrelated to the military. American 
tribunals represent potential alternatives to courts-martial in two con-
texts. First, insofar as foreign civilian courts are considered unaccept-
able alternative tribunals, the availability of an American tribunal 
might be a basis for frustrating military jurisdiction, regardless of 
whether the relevant SOFA allocates jurisdiction over the crime con-
currently to the host nation and the United States or exclusively to the 
United States. Second, even to the extent that foreign courts may be 
deemed acceptable, American alternatives may in some instances re-
present the only basis for depriving the military of jurisdiction. Those 
instances arise because of the jurisdictional gap created either by a 
grant under the applicable SOFA of exclusive jurisdiction to the 
United States,116 or by the host country's reluctance to prosecute 
crimes over which it shares concurrent jurisdiction with the United 
States. If the United States has been given exclusive jurisdiction over 
a particular crime by the SOFA provisions, and if that offense is other-
wise unrelated to military service, there exists no readily apparent 
foreign tribunal in which to try the offender. Therefore, if court-
martial jurisdiction is to be restrained, it is necessary to satisfy the 
military exigencies by employing an American tribunal outside the 
military system. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, the im-
116. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 276-80; cf. the discussion of this gap in text 
accompanying note 46 supra. See also the NATO SOFA provisions set out in notes 
40-41 supra. 
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portance of this gap is heightened by the reluctance often shovm by 
foreign authorities to prosecute crimes which are placed under con-
current jurisdiction by the SOFA provisions, but which primarily in-
volve American interests.117 To the extent that foreign courts decline 
to try such offenses, there is again a failure of available alternatives 
unless American civil tribunals are able to bridge the "jurisdictional 
gap." 
Since the procedures of the American tribunals under considera-
tion are subject to constitutional limitations, no discussion of proce-
dural adequacy is necessary, as it is in the case of foreign courts; and 
consequently the focus of present discussion may be centered on the 
search for viable alternatives and on the practical difficulties encoun-
tered in their implementation. By and large, American civilian courts 
are not presently available in foreign countries, and so specific gov-
ernmental action is required in order for them to be established. 
Thus, the desirability of each alternative set forth below must be 
tempered with an understanding of the difficulties involved in mo-
tivating the appropriate authorities to take the necessary action. For 
example, the establishment of American tribunals would in every 
case deprive the host country of existing jurisdiction or othenvise 
infringe on the host nation's sovereignty and consequently would 
require delicate diplomatic negotiations. This difficulty is intensified 
by the fact that the motivating force behind such action would 
necessarily be based on a desire to thwart military jurisdiction-a 
motive which is certainly not uniformly possessed by present govern-
mental leadership. 
While a wide variety of proposals have been advanced for the 
use of American civilian procedures to replace courts-martial in situa-
tions in which military jurisdiction has been curtailed,118 the alterna-
tive suggestions set forth below are limited to those which seem most 
easily accessible and most relevant to the problems created by the 
ramifications of O'Callahan. 
A. American Courts Sitting Abroad 
A proposal which seems initially to be a practicable method of 
supplementing court-martial jurisdiction in foreign countries when 
special military needs do not otherwise dictate a military trial, is 
the creation of American federal courts to hear cases in the foreign 
countries.119 Two basic objections, however, override the feasibility 
of such an alternative. First, the existing Status of Forces Agreements 
providing for the encroachment by the American military on an area 
117. See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
118. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 280·85; Girard, supra note 2!l, at 503-19. 
119. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 282. 
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of inherent foreign jurisdiction were obtained only after extensive 
negotiation.120 The implementation of overseas American courts 
would further encroach on the host country's jurisdiction, and fur-
ther negotiating would be required. The likelihood of the receptive-
ness of these countries to such extended encroachment is at best 
doubtful.121 Second, there are serious questions as to how a jury of 
unbiased peers, sufficiently independent of military influence, could 
be selected by such a court.122 Indeed, in view of the questionable 
ability of these courts to provide such a basic constitutional safeguard 
as the right to an unbiased jury, 123 it seems inadvisable to enter into 
extended negotiations seeking their establishment. 
B. Domestic Federal Courts 
Another alternative often advanced to handle the prosecution of 
a serviceman who, while abroad, commits a crime unrelated to the 
military, is to provide for trial in a federal district court sitting in 
the United States.124 While this alternative is apparently consistent 
with principles of international law,125 as well as with the Constitu-
tion,126 the primary objection is the problem involved in the securing 
of witnesses. Although it has been suggested that American citizens 
could readily be persuaded or compelled to return to the United 
States to testify, there is apparently no existing system to compel 
foreign nationals to participate in trials conducted in the United 
States, nor are their countries likely to favor the institution of such 
a system.127 Moreover, it seems somewhat unconscionable to require 
foreign citizens to suffer the inconvenience of being transported to 
the United States in order to testify in the prosecution of a crime 
committed on their own soil. At any rate, the cost and intricacies of 
implementing such a system would be so great as to justify its utiliza-
120. See Hearings oii Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed 
Forces, and Military Headquarters Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 
121. See Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger's dissent in United States ex rel. 
Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 939 n.26(d) (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
122. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 282. See also Everett, supra note 23, at 375, 
expressing the opinion that it would be "impossible in these circumstances to empanel 
a jury conforming to sixth-amendment qualifications. A serviceman, however, may 
prefer that the jury be under military influence so that they might more easily identify 
with him, especially in the overseas context. 
123. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 282; Girard, supra note 23, at 505. 
124. Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 281; Girard, supra note 23, at 507. 
125. See Girard, supra note 23, at 507-08, and cites contained therein. 
126. Id. See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); United 
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
127. Girard, supra note 2!1, at 509-10. 
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tion only in cases involving the gravest or most serious offenses.1:?8 
However, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, it appears that as the 
gravity of the offense increases, the likelihood that the host country 
would take jurisdiction also increases. Nevertheless, in the area of 
exclusive American jurisdiction, the host country's willingness to 
prosecute is irrelevant, and consequently trial in a domestic federal 
court remains a viable alternative. It seems, therefore, that trial in 
domestic federal courts may be a feasible and effective, even if intri-
cate, device for disposing of some of the more serious offenses.129 
However, because it has been held by the Supreme Court that the 
"legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is 
construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States,"130 the vesting of domestic federal courts with power 
to hear such cases would require the augmentation of the United 
States' criminal law codes to include crimes committed by citizens 
in foreign lands. -
C. United States Magistrates' Courts and the Petty-Offense 
Exception 
Since minor or petty offenses seem to be separable from more 
serious crimes in terms both of practical variations and of differences 
in the procedural safeguards required in the prosecution of each,131 
a plan has been advanced providing for the separate treatment of 
petty offenses committed abroad by United States servicemen; those 
offenses would be tried in special United States Magistrates' 
Courts.132 
At the outset, however, the establishment of commissioner's courts 
sitting abroad seems to be an unaceptable method of escaping the 
predicament of O'Callahan. The basic problem, similar to that dis-
cussed with regard to establishing ordinary federal courts sitting 
abroad,133 is one of gaining acceptance by the host country. But per-
haps more important, because the proposed magistrates' courts 
128. Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 281. 
129. See Girard, supra note 23, at 509, where, in connection with an examination 
of the feasibility of domestic federal courts as alternative fora, the author concluded: 
"I believe the cost, delay, and disruptive effect on military operations of trial in the 
United States has been greatly exaggerated." 
130. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). See also Girard, supra 
note 23, at 507. 
131. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUR!:: CRIMINAL § 371 (1969); 
Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 245 (1959); Nelson &: West-
brook, supra note 5, at 34; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 63, 149 
(1968). 
132. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 285. 
133. See te.xt accompanying note 121 supra. 
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would handle only petty offenses, they would not constitutionally be 
required to provide for grand jury indictment and jury trial.134 Ac-
cordingly, they seem to be subject to an inability to provide the ac-
cused serviceman with the benefits denied him in the military 
tribunals. In this respect, the objection to these proposed magis-
trates' courts comes perilously near to the objection voiced against 
foreign courts.135 Even though the severity of removing the service-
man from the grasp of the military is lessened considerably by the 
fact that he does not thereby become subject to the importunities of 
foreign trial and confinement, the underlying anomaly persists. As 
in the case of foreign civilian courts, the serviceman would be re-
moved from one court that lacks requisite constitutional safeguards 
and placed in another, yet more unfamiliar, tribunal which lacks 
the same safeguards. 
Moreover, it is possible that O'Callahan will be interpreted to 
allow a petty-offense exception for the military disposition of minor 
offenses, thereby obviating the need for an American civil tribunal, 
such as the magistrates' court, to handle such offenses. In this 
regard, it has been suggested by at least two commentators that petty 
offenses should be exempted from examination under the "service-
connected" test formulated in O'Callahan.136 Indeed, the Court of 
Military Appeals, consistent with its approach to foreign alternatives, 
has specifically recognized such an exception, holding that the reach 
of military jurisdiction "encompasses the trial of those petty offenses, 
for which, in civil life, the accused would not be entitled to the con-
stitutional protections of grand-jury indictment and jury trial."137 
Since the defendant in a case involving petty offense would not enjoy 
increased procedural safeguards in a civilian tribunal, it seems incon-
sistent to deny military jurisdiction for failure to provide those safe-
guards. Therefore, since the court-martial is apparently an acceptable 
forum for dealing with petty offenses,138 the inducement for the es-
tablishment of specialized tribunals to deal with petty offenses is 
further allayed. Under the petty-offense exception, the military un-
doubtedly would continue to refer petty offenses to its own courts-
martial, and the magistrates' courts would not handle enough cases 
to justify their existence. 
134. See note 131 supra. 
135. See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra. 
136. Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 34-39. 
137. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 28, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969). 
138. Petty offenders customarily are tried by the military authorities in summary 
and special courts-martial. See Nelson &: 'Westbrook, supra note 5, at 36-37. Ad-
ministrative sanctions for minor offenses also are authorized by UCMJ art. 15, IO 
U.S.C. § 815 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). These sanctions include the 
nonjudicial deprivation of privileges and the imposition of certain restrictions. They 
are offered to the offender as a voluntary alternative to court-martial. 
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D. Feasibility of American Courts as Alternative Fora 
Of all the American tribunals which are possible alternatives to 
military courts, only the federal court sitting in the United States 
is an acceptable alternative. While the use of such courts to handle 
crimes committed overseas gives rise to numerous difficulties, it has 
been seriously advanced as an efficacious system for dealing with 
some very serious offenses.139 The implementation of such a scheme, 
however, requires specific legislative action, and the instigation of 
such action is replete with further obstacles. At best, therefore, this 
alternative is a future solution which must await specific action to 
effect its implementation. 
The feasibility of the other suggseted American tribunals is 
severely limited. The establishment of American courts abroad is 
generally considered to be impracticable. To the extent that mag-
istrates' courts sitting abroad could otherwise be made feasible, 
their utility is prohibitively limited, since they would be effective 
only in the area of petty offenses, where it is seriously doubtful that 
military jurisdiction need be, or can be, restricted at all. Thus, it 
seems that American courts are not currently available to remove 
the need of the military to prosecute offenders in its own court 
system. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In formulating a final determination as to the applicability of 
O'Callahan v. Parker to crimes committed by servicemen while sta-
tioned abroad, one must come to a conclusion as to the overriding 
purpose of the Court in restricting military jurisdiction. If the aim of 
O'Callahan was to preserve the individual constitutional guarantees 
of the accused serviceman, then the approach of the Court of Military 
Appeals in absolutely requiring a constitutionally acceptable alterna-
tive court before denying military jurisdiction seems appropriate.140 
If, however, O' Callahan is seen as an effort to define the range of 
offensive conduct which may be governed by "Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"141 then the un-
derlying purpose can be seen as the restriction of military power for 
the mere sake of limiting the span of its jurisdictional comprehension, 
and the Girard attitude of indifference toward alternative proce-
dures appears to be more nearly correct. 
This delineation of motives, however, may prove to be too sim-
plistic, for neither interpretation seems to pay proper deference to 
139. See notes 124-30 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. 
141. This is the approach suggested at the text accompanying note 64 supra. Su 
also Everett, supra note 9, at 893. 
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the Court's unarticulated rationale in O'Callahan. Indeed, the Court 
appears to have adopted a middle ground. Obviously, the Court was 
motivated by a simple desire to restrict military jurisdiction. But this 
distrust of military authority was tempered by a concern for the con-
stitutional rights of the individual serviceman. The "service-con-
nected" test, then, is the verbalization of the method which the Court 
employed to prevent an overextension of the grasp of the military 
in situations in which the objections raised by the fundamental pro-
cedural infirmities of the court-martial outweigh the special needs of 
the military to preserve discipline. The approach of the Court of 
Military Appeals places too much significance on these procedural 
infirmities by elevating them to the level of primary concern and 
absolutely requiring a procedurally superior alternative tribunal be-
fore restricting military jurisdiction; while the contrasting approach 
-that is, that comparative procedures are irrelevant-is equally in-
appropriate because it fails to accord recognition to the practical 
implications of relegating accused servicemen to tribunals that are 
as imperfect as are military courts themselves. 
Initially, an examination of available alternative tribunals sug-
gests that foreign civilian courts provide an acceptable basis for 
restricting court-martial jurisdiction, since the military's special needs 
arguably will be fulfilled by any court which metes out punishment 
for the offenses in question. However, the extraterritorial situs of the 
crime reintroduces the practical relevance of comparative procedures, 
since, absent the feasibility of handling the case in an American court, 
the military courts and foreign civilian courts present, at best, equally 
objectionable choices. In light of the complicating factors thus intro-
duced by the intricacies of international relationships, there seems 
to be little practical justification for the restriction of military juris-
diction for its own sake when no corresponding benefit is conferred 
upon the individual serviceman. Furthermore, when there is a cor-
responding detriment suffered by the serviceman as a result of being 
placed in an unfamiliar tribunal with no possibility of review in 
American courts, the restriction of military jurisdiction is not only 
unjustified but unconscionable as well. 
Thus, it appears that the Court's basis for decision in O'Callahan 
was a simple desire to restrict military authority, tempered by the 
practical concerns for the resulting effects on the accused serviceman. 
Weighing the basic arguments for the protection of the serviceman's 
fundamental rights against the minimal advantages to be gained by 
limiting military jurisdiction, it is submitted that the objections 
discussed above should operate to make the O'Callahan doctrine in-
applicable to offenses committed by servicemen abroad. 
